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PAMELA L.J. HUFF AND RUSSELL C. SILBERGLIED*
From Production Resources to Peoples
Department Stores:
A Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian
Courts on the Fiduciary Duties of Directors to
Creditors of Insolvent Companies**
IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASING SCRUTINY of corporate behavior
after corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom,' lawsuits brought by credi-
tors or bankruptcy trustees against officers and directors have become more com-
mon.2 The suits are taking center stage, particularly on the dockets of courts in the
United States, and are receiving much public attention.
Against this backdrop, two prominent courts-the Supreme Court of Canada
and the Delaware Court of Chancery-issued widely influential opinions within
Pamela Huff is a partner at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP in Toronto, Ontario, and Russell C.
Silberglied is a director of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. in Wilmington, Del. The analysis and conclusions set
forth in this Article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of their firms, their employers, or their
clients.
- This article, originally published in the Annual Review of Insolvency Law, was written in 2005 in
anticipation of the Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies
conference at the University of Maryland School of Law. Since that time, the Delaware Court of Chancery has
addressed the issue of fiduciary duties of directors of insolvent companies or nearly insolvent companies, or the
related issue of deepening insolvency, three times. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 906
A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ.A. 1456-N,
2006 WL 2588971 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2006); Big Lot Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, No. Civ.A. 1081-
N, 2006 WL 846121 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2006). Additionally, federal bankruptcy courts have continued to
address these issues, including the Delaware bankruptcy court. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006). These new cases help to flesh out the concepts expressed in Production Resources and
related authorities, rather than fundamentally altering the state of the law.
Moreover, as this article was going to press, the Delaware Supreme Court issued its first opinion on this
area of law, North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. 521, 2006,
2007 WL 1453705 (Del. May 18, 2007). For the most part, North American Catholic embraces the Court of
Chancery's formulations of the duties of directors set forth in Production Resources and described below.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court does appear to have disagreed, to a certain extent, with Production
Resources with respect to certain concepts. Because North American Catholic was issued just prior to this article
going to print, those distinctions are not set forth in the article that appears below.
1. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrest Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judg-
ment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. LAW. 865, 866 (2005).
2. See Sabin Willet, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 Bus. LAW. 549, 549 (2005).
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one month of each other on whether and to what extent officers and directors of an
insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to creditors. Despite (or perhaps be-
cause of, and in an effort to rein in) the increasing frequency of such suits, both
courts held that the concept of fiduciary duty law should not be used to "fill gaps
[in the protection of creditors] that do not exist."3
This Article examines in detail the facts of the Production Resources and Peoples
Department Stores cases and the statutory and legal frameworks in Delaware and
Canada. It then examines each court's analysis of the issues of fiduciary duty, duty
of care, the business judgment rule, the effect of insolvency of the corporation, and
the available remedies for creditors. It notes the striking similarity in the courts'
approaches to these issues. Specifically, it notes that where a corporation becomes
insolvent, the directors' primary duty remains to the corporation itself, just as it
did when the company was solvent. But the primary constituencies whose interests
are at stake obviously changes-a factor that directors must take into account in
making good-faith business decisions. It considers whether the decisions in Produc-
tion Resources and Peoples Department Stores have opened or closed the gap on
creditor claims against directors and, in such landscape, what advice may be offered
to directors and officers of Delaware and Canadian corporations as to how to oper-
ate an insolvent company and make business decisions given the competing inter-
ests of stockholders and creditors.
The decisions in Production Resources and Peoples Department Stores followed
inconsistent lower court decisions in Canada, varied results in U.S. courts, and
much academic commentary as to the scope of director duties and what is appro-
priate in our societies. Corporate governance is at the heart of the debate as to the
appropriate scope of fiduciary obligations of directors. Statutes in Canada and
common law in the United States and Canada require directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation. While the corporation is solvent, that "best interest"
has been viewed as the best interests of the shareholders, who hold the residual
interest.
Where the corporation has become insolvent, shareholder equity may have mini-
mal or no value. The residual interest in an insolvency lies with the creditors. To
what extent do director duties shift or expand in an insolvency to recognize the
shift in the residual economic interest? Both the Delaware Court of Chancery and
the Supreme Court of Canada have determined that there is no fundamental shift
in director duties.
Indeed, notwithstanding that the statutory and/or common law frameworks for
Canadian and Delaware corporations differ in certain material respects, the Su-
preme Court of Canada and the Delaware Court of Chancery used remarkably
similar language in rendering their opinions. For example, both courts recognized
3. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Peoples Dep't
Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise (In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 486.
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(i) that what is in the "'best interests of the corporation' should be read not simply
as the 'best interests of the shareholders,"' but that "[flrom an economic perspec-
tive, the 'best interests of the corporation' means the maximization of the value of
the corporation";4 (ii) that the changing economic fortunes of a company often
alter what is in the best interests of the corporate enterprise;' (iii) that as a result of
their becoming the residual risk bearers of the insolvent corporate enterprise, credi-
tors have remedies through either oppression claims in Canada or derivative fiduci-
ary duty claims in Canada and Delaware, and the arsenal of fraudulent preference
and conveyance claims;6 (iv) that the nature or content of directors' duties do not
change when a company enters the nebulous "zone of insolvency";7 and (s,) that
fiduciary duty law should not be used to fill in nonexistent gaps where other, ex-
isting laws already protect creditors.'
The holdings of these two cases differ in a technical sense, with the Delaware
Court of Chancery reiterating that fiduciary duties are owed to creditors as well as
shareholders and the Supreme Court of Canada holding that no such fiduciary
duties are owed to the creditors. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized a duty
of loyalty, if not fiduciary duty to creditors. Both courts, however, emphasized that
the primary duty is owed to the corporate enterprise itself and recognized that
upon insolvency, what is in the best interest of the enterprise might change, as does
the identity of the residual risk bearers, from the shareholders to the creditors, but
the duty itself does not shift away from the corporation. Thus, it is unclear from a
practical standpoint that there is much of a real distinction in the two courts' hold-
ings, or in the practical advice lawyers should give directors of Canadian and Dela-
ware corporations in the aftermath of Peoples Department Stores and Production
Resources.
That in itself is a welcome development, given that so many entities have both
Delaware corporations and corporations organized in Canada in their family trees.
Delaware has been and continues to be a leading forum in the United States for
reorganizations of insolvent companies, and an increasing number of cross-border
insolvencies involve Delaware and Canadian businesses and operations. Advice to
directors of North American enterprises will have some consistency.
I. PRODUCTION RESOURCES: THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY'S
MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Delaware Court of Chancery's November 2004 opinion in Production Resources
is likely the most important pronouncement on the nature of fiduciary duty claims
brought by creditors since the Court of Chancery's 1991 opinion in Credit Lyonnais
4. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 481; accord Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 791.
5. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 482; Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 788.
6. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 484-85; Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 792.
7. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 483; Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790 n.56.
8. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 485-86; Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790.
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Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.9 Its factual background and
legal framework are set forth below to put the holding into perspective.
A. Factual Background
In 1999, Production Resources Group, L.L.C. (PRG) installed computer-controlled
audio systems for NCT Group, Inc. (NCT). NCT failed to pay PRG for the equip-
ment. Presumably because NCT represented that it could not pay the debt, and to
avoid litigation, PRG agreed to enter into a "resolution agreement"" with NCT
providing that in lieu of a full cash payment, PRG would accept from NCT
$1,906,221 in cash and 6.7 million shares of NCT stock. After NCT failed to pay
and failed to issue and register the stock, PRG sought and obtained a judgment in
Connecticut state court against NCT in the amount of $2 million plus interest and
costs. PRG thereafter tried, without success, to collect on the judgment in
Connecticut.
Thereafter, Carole Salkind, the wife of one of NCT's ex-directors, supplied NCT
with more than $28 million in capital in the form of equity and secured debt, even
though she was a legal secretary without apparent means to account for her ability
to provide the capital. As a secured creditor, Salkind obtained liens on all of the
company's tangible assets, including the stock of its subsidiaries. Additionally, eight
companies affiliated with the Salkind family were retained as paid consultants to
the company. Although Salkind was not technically a controlling stockholder of
NCT, the court noted that she had de facto control over NCT:
To be clear, Salkind is not technically NCT's controlling stockholder. None-
theless, she is undisputedly the primary creditor of the company. The company
has a history of defaulting on her loans, paying penalties and refinancing
them, and her loans have been procured in exchange for convertible notes and
warrants that, if exercised, would give her more shares of NCT than are cur-
rently outstanding. Furthermore, Salkind allegedly has liens on all the assets of
NCT, including the stock of its subsidiaries. In short, it is fairly inferable that
Salkind, at her will, can assume practical control over NCT by either exercising
her foreclosure rights in default or by converting and becoming a controlling
shareholder. In essence, PRG fairly alleges that Salkind is NCT's de facto con-
trolling shareholder and that her interests are being inequitably favored over
PRG's and other creditor's interest by a complicit board."
9. No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
10. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 778. The Production Resources opinion denied a motion to dismiss
the complaint. Id. at 777. As such, it accepted all well-pled facts as true. Id. The factual background presented
herein, therefore, constitutes the facts as recited by the Court, given this legal standard.
11. Id. at 781.
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Salkind proceeded to use this position of control to attempt to keep the company
afloat and yet not pay the PRG judgment. For example, she made capital infusions
into NCT's subsidiaries, rather than NCT itself, so that the cash would not be
subject to the judgment. Nevertheless, Salkind took convertible notes from NCT
itself as consideration for the cash advances to its subsidiaries. 2 Additionally, the
company issued or pledged to Salkind and others more shares of NCT stock than
was authorized by NCT's charter-indeed, billions of shares in excess of what was
authorized. Additionally, in violation of Delaware law,'" NCT did not hold a stock-
holder meeting for over two years, blaming its inability to afford the proxy materi-
als associated with an annual meeting. The court also noted that, while failing to
pay PRG and suffering shockingly large annual losses for five consecutive years, the
company paid substantial performance-related bonuses to two of its directors.
To protect its rights, PRG filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery. In addi-
tion to seeking to appoint a receiver for NCT because of its insolvency, 4 PRG
alleged that NCT's directors had breached their fiduciary duties owed to PRG. Ac-
cording to PRG, because NCT was insolvent, its directors owed fiduciary duties
directly to creditors, and creditors, in their own individual capacity, could sue for
breach of fiduciary duty.
B. Legal Framework in Delaware
The common-law" duties of directors and officers of a solvent corporation are well
documented and understood. The primary fiduciary duties of corporate directors
12. Although not noted by the court, it appears that PRG could have argued that NCT's issuance of the
convertible notes was a fraudulent transfer, either because of actual fraudulent intent or because NCT itself (as
opposed to the subsidiaries) did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for the notes. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (1999 & Supp. 2004). Interestingly, the court did note that creditors typically are
protected by, inter alia, fraudulent transfer laws.
13. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring stockholder meetings to be held at
least every thirteen months).
14. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 775. PRG sought the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
section 291 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which permits the Court of Chancery, upon application
by a stockholder or creditor, to appoint a receiver for a corporation which is held, after trial, to be insolvent. Id.
The appointment of receivers under Delaware state law has become increasingly infrequent in modern times;
generally, insolvent Delaware companies either voluntarily file for bankruptcy or state law dissolution or their
creditors file an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. See DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
& PRACTICE § 39.01, at 39-3 (2003) (concluding that section 291 is, for the most part, a "dead letter"). This
aspect of the Production Resources opinion, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. Unlike the federal and common-law jurisdictions of Canada, which will be discussed below, the source
of Delaware fiduciary duty law is entirely based on common law, not a statute. See generally DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141 (2001) (providing that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under
the direction of the board of directors, but not specifying the manner in which such directors must exercise
their fiduciary duties); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003) (citation
omitted) (noting that "[taking action that is otherwise legally possible, however, does not ipso facto comport
with the fiduciary responsibilities of directors in all circumstances"); id. at 939 (stating that "Delaware corpora-
tion law . . . is based on an enabling statute with the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court applying
principles of fiduciary duty in a common law mode on a case-by-case basis") (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
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of a Delaware corporation are the duties of loyalty, care, and good faith. 6 The duty
of care requires a director to exercise the degree of care in managing the corpora-
tion's affairs that an "ordinarily careful and prudent [person] would use in similar
circumstances." 7 Before making a business decision, directors must call forth and
consider "all material information reasonably available to them." The duty of loy-
alty prohibits a corporate director from engaging in self-dealing or usurping corpo-
rate opportunities in the performance of his or her duties as a director. 9 A
director's material financial interest that conflicts with or is potentially in conflict
with the interests of the company directly implicates this duty. The duty of good
faith requires directors to act in what they honestly believe to be the corporation's
best interest as opposed to any other interest."
In exercising these duties, directors of a Delaware corporation are protected by
the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a judicially created pre-
sumption in favor of the nonconflicted (i.e., disinterested) corporate director that
"in making a business decision [he/she] ... acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."'" The Delaware Court of Chancery has held that it is "an elementary
precept of corporation law: [that] in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or
improper motive, a corporate officer or director is not legally responsible to the
corporation for losses that may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer
made or that directors authorized in good faith."22 This is the case even where the
court believes that the board decision, in hindsight, is "substantively wrong, or...
'stupid' . . . 'egregious' or 'irrational." 23 The business judgment rule can be rebut-
ted by a showing of a breach of the duty of care, loyalty, or good faith. 4 Once the
business judgment rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the directors to prove that
the transaction was entirely fair.2"
16. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 1999).
17. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
18. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount Commc'ns Inc. S'holder Litig.),
637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (citation omitted); In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996).
19. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating that corporate directors' fiduciary duty
"requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest").
20. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)
(citations omitted).
21. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted); accord Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at
182, 184.
22. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996) (footnote omitted).
23. In re Caremark., 698 A.2d at 967.
24. See, e.g., Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
25. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Del. 1994); Cede, 634 A.2d at
361.
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It is well settled that the fiduciary obligations of a director of a solvent company
are owed to the corporation. 6 Those same fiduciary duties extend to the corpora-
tion's shareholders who, as proprietors of the business enterprise, are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased value.27 In contrast, direc-
tors of a solvent Delaware corporation owe no fiduciary obligation to the corpora-
tion's creditors." Delaware courts have routinely rejected efforts to expand the
fiduciary obligations of directors of solvent companies to creditors, finding that a
creditor's rights are fixed by contract with the corporation. 9 Indeed, favoring a
creditor over a shareholder of a solvent Delaware corporation might constitute a
breach of the director's fiduciary obligations."
When a Delaware corporation becomes insolvent in fact, the class of constituen-
cies to whom directors owe duties expands to include creditors." Although certain
non-Delaware courts have held that corporate directors no longer owe a fiduciary
duty to shareholders upon insolvency, the Delaware decisions are clear that upon
insolvency, directors' fiduciary duties expand to include consideration of both
creditors and shareholders. 2 This principle was recently reinforced by the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, applying Delaware law, which
held that Delaware law requires that "[directors] managing a corporation 'in the
vicinity of insolvency,'. . . must consider the best interests of the corporation, and
not just the interests of either creditors or shareholders alone."3
There are two primary rationales provided for the expansion of fiduciary duties
to include creditors. The first, the trust fund theory, provides that the directors of
an insolvent company hold the company's assets in trust for the benefit of credi-
tors. 4 A second rationale, the "at risk" theory, contemplates that as a corporation
approaches insolvency, corporate directors may adopt high-risk strategies to save
26. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
27. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 179 (citations omitted); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
28. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (stating that "[b]efore a fiduciary duty arises, an
existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist"); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns. Co.,
621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
29. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); Simons, 549 A.2d at 303.
30. See Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182, 184.
31. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004).
32. See, e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Del. Ch. 1997) (finding that
directors of a company "on the lip of insolvency" did not breach their fiduciary duties in preferring the interests
of common equity over preferred equity, which had a liquidation preference); Geyer, 621 A.2d at 789; Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30 1991).
33. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL COM Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL COM
Primecall, Inc.), No. 01-11457, 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003).
34. See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714
F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1983); Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944); Asmussen v.
Quaker City Corp.,156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931).
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value for shareholders unless they are tasked with additional duties to creditors. 5
In doing so, directors may put creditors, who at that point are likely the true
residual claimants to and beneficiaries of the corporation, at risk if they were solely
charged with maximizing value for stockholders. 6
The Credit Lyonnais decision noted that sometimes "the community of interests
that the corporation represents" will diverge from the best interests of stockholders
even when the company is solvent, if it is in the "zone of insolvency":
[I]n managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the
fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the
stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested
in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act."
The court posited an example, in its famous footnote fifty-five, wherein a com-
pany has but one asset-proceeds from litigation-and the expected value of the
outcome of that litigation is less than the company's liabilities, but some possibility
of a judgment or a settlement in excess of liabilities exists. By implying that "the
right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow"38 arguably was to accept a
settlement at or higher than the expected value-thereby ensuring insolvency and
no return for the stockholders-many read this footnote to hold that creditors
affirmatively have the right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to them by filing suit,
as long as the company was in the zone of insolvency. 9
C. The Production Resources Opinion
1. The Court's Dicta Concerning the Zone of Insolvency and the Business
Judgment Rule
In his opinion in Production Resources, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine Jr. analyzed the
underlying basis for the claim by PRG that NCT had breached fiduciary duties to
PRG, a creditor of NCT. In doing so, in what amounts to several pages of scholarly
dicta, he first took issue with the assertion that disgruntled creditors of companies
that are solvent but within the zone of insolvency may affirmatively press claims of
35. See Donald S. Bernstein & Amit Sibal, Current Developments: Fiduciary Duties of Directors and Corpo-
rate Governance in the Vicinity of Insolvency, in 23RD ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND
LITIGATION 653, 658 (2001).
36. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group,
Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968-69 (D. Del. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss because a
complaint alleged that even if the company was not insolvent, it was at least in the zone of insolvency).
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breach of fiduciary duties owed to them.4" The Vice Chancellor stated that "Credit
Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who claimed that the
directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as the company would not
technically breach any legal obligations."'" This shield helps creditors "because di-
rectors, it can be presumed; generally take seriously the company's duty to pay its
bills as a first priority."42 The court stated that the cases that "[s]omewhat oddly...
read ... [Credit Lyonnais] as creating a new body of creditor's rights law" 3 are "not
unproblematic."44
The court noted several fundamental problems in expanding the scope of fiduci-
ary duties to creditors merely because the company is in the zone of insolvency.
First, "[a]rguably, it involves using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not
exist."45 The court noted that unlike stockholders, creditors can protect themselves
with contractual provisions such as covenants and liens on assets.46 Moreover, cred-
itors are protected by fraudulent transfer laws, implied covenants of good faith and
fair dealing, and to a certain extent, federal bankruptcy law.47 The court therefore
concluded,
[w]ith these protections, when creditors are unable to prove that a corporation
or its directors breached any of the specific legal duties owed to them, one
would think that the conceptual room for concluding that the creditors were
somehow, nevertheless, injured by inequitable conduct would be extremely
small, if extant. Having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm's
creditors, the board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic
risk for the benefit of the firm's equity owners, so long as the directors comply
with their fiduciary duties to the firm by selecting and pursuing with fidelity
and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm's value.4"
40. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 787-88.
44. Id. at 789-90.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 790.
47. Id. It is worth noting that the court's observations might not be accurate with respect to all creditors.
For example, tort creditors cannot negotiate covenants, and many trade creditors doing small business with
debtors cannot afford to and do not operate under complex contracts. Additionally, the law of fraudulent
transfers protects creditors only to the extent that the business decision they are challenging was in fact a
transfer; if the decision they are challenging is a failure to act, fraudulent transfer statutes are unhelpful. Con-
trast this to the statutory oppression remedy under the business corporations statutes of Canada and its com-
mon law provinces and territories, which the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores relied
upon in holding that an additional remedy for breach of fiduciary duties is unnecessary. The oppression rem-
edy appears to protect creditors in a greater percentage of circumstances than the ability to negotiate covenants
and fraudulent transfer law, but Delaware does not have an oppression statute.
48. Id.
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The court also took issue with the concept that the constituency to whom fiduci-
ary duties are owed fundamentally changes when a company is solvent but in the
zone of insolvency, on two different grounds."' First, it noted that the zone "is an
admittedly confusing one" to define, and is "not... a simple exercise," permitting
"talented creditors' lawyers [to] . . . press for an expansive view."' Coupled with the
lenient pleading standards, a legal principle permitting creditors to pursue claims
against directors if the "company is within some imprecise and hard-to-define vi-
cinity of insolvency" will lead to a proliferation of suits against directors of compa-
nies later determined to be solvent but which survive a motion to dismiss.5"
Second, presumably stockholders would not lose the right to sue directors of a
corporation in the zone of insolvency, which means that directors could be exposed
to competing suits arguing for mutually exclusive, indeed polar opposite, out-
comes.52 In this regard, the court noted that although creditors of insolvent corpo-
rations are often referred to as the company's residual risk bearers, that is not
entirely accurate-just that a company is insolvent does not mean it cannot, under
any circumstances, turn around and leave some benefit for equity. Creditors have
no incentive to push the company to take a course of action leading to that result;
all they care about is getting paid as close to full recovery as possible.53
Given this tension, the court took pains to emphasize that faced with competing
creditor and stockholder goals, the duties of directors run primarily "to the firm
and their duty to responsibly maximize its value, a duty that might require pursu-
ing a strategy that neither the stockholders nor the creditors would prefer."54 It
often is an admittedly difficult task to balance these competing constituencies and
determine what, in fact, is in the best interests of the corporate enterprise. Thus,
the Vice Chancellor stated that he "doubt[s] the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to
second-guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone."5 In a reaffirma-
49. Interestingly, despite citing Production Resources with approval on other points, a federal court in
Delaware recently held that in order to maintain suit against officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty,
a liquidation trust comprised of creditors had the "burden to prove that the Director Defendants owed a duty
to the creditors by proving that Hechinger was operating in the vicinity of insolvency." Liquidation Trust of
Hechinger Inv. Co. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co.), 327 B.R. 537, 548 (D. Del. 2005)
(emphasis added). Given that the discussion of the zone of insolvency in Production Resources was dicta (albeit
scholarly dicta), and the many cases that preceded it that referred favorably to the commencement of duties to
creditors upon the company's falling into the zone of insolvency, it is likely that the concept will continue to
pervade despite Production Resources until a more definitive ruling decides the issue.
50. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 789 n.56; see also id. at 788 n.52 (commenting that "I doubt ...
that there is a magic dividing line that should signal the end to some, most, or all risk-taking on behalf of...
creditors").
51. Id. at 789 n.56.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 790 n.57.
54. Id. (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1191
WL 277613, at *34 n.35 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see also Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns. Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789
(Del. Ch. 1992) (stating that directors should "choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate
enterprise rather than any single group interested in the corporation").
55. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790 n.57.
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tion of the business judgment rule in the context of creditor-initiated suits,5 6 the
court asked, "Absent self-dealing or other evidence of bad faith, by what measure is
a court fairly to critique the choice [of creditor versus shareholder interests] made
through an award of damages?""'
In a recently published law review article, the former Chief Justice of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court agreed that Production Resources "reaffirms what, in [his]
view, has always been the law-that directors who make good faith, careful judg-
ments in the honest belief that they are acting in the best interests of the corpora-
tion should not fear liability.""
2. The Holding: Fiduciary Duties are Owed to Creditors if the Company is
Insolvent, but Creditors Only have Derivative Standing to Sue
Although the court's exploration of the zone of insolvency described above will
likely have long-ranging consequences and be cited in cases and articles around the
United States, it is all dicta; the court itself noted that "[fiortunately, this case does
not require me to explore the metaphysical boundaries of the zone of insolvency."59
Instead, the court held that at least at the pleadings stage, PRG successfully alleged
that NCT was insolvent in fact. Therefore, the court applied the "more well-settled
line of authority": "When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it is settled
that under Delaware law, the firm's directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the
company's creditors."'
Unlike allowing creditors to sue a company that merely is in the zone of insol-
vency, the court held that this "uncontroversial proposition ... does not completely
turn on its head the equitable obligations of the directors to the firm itself."" After
all, both before and after insolvency, the directors' focus is to maximize the com-
pany's value, either as a going concern or, if appropriate, in a sale--"[tihat much of
their job does not change. '62 Rather, insolvency merely "affect[s] the constituency
on whose behalf the directors are pursuing that end."6' For example, "poor deci-
56. See Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(finding that "there is room for application of the business judgment rule" in suits commenced by creditors);
Liquidation Trust of Hechinger Inv. Co. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co.), 327 B.R. 537, 549
(D. Del. 2005) (citing Production Resources for the proposition that "the business judgment rule remains im-
portant and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, prudent judgments about the
risks they should undertake on behalf of troubled firms").
57. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790 n.57; see also id. at 788 n.52 (noting that "the business
judgment rule remains important and provides directors with the ability to make a range of good faith, pru-
dent judgments about the risks they should undertake on behalf of troubled firms").
58. E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?: A
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1430 (2005).
59. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 790.
60. Id. at 790-91.
61. Id. at 791(emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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sions by management may erode the value of the remaining assets, leaving the
corporation with even less capital to satisfy its debts in an ultimate dissolution."64
As a result, "[t]he elimination of the stockholders' interest in the firm and the
increased risk to creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations towards
the company's creditors on the directors."65
The fact that fiduciary duties are owed to creditors, however, transforms neither
the relationship between any particular creditor and the company, nor the nature
of the harm if directors fail to carry out their duties. The creditor-company rela-
tionship is still governed by contract and other law. Moreover, the court reaffirmed
its holding from a 1931 opinion that "the mere fact that directors of an insolvent
firm favor certain creditors over others of similar priority does not constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty, absent self-dealing.""
Moreover, and perhaps more central to the court's actual holding, the nature of
the harm for breach of fiduciary duties owed to creditors is a harm to the corpora-
tion, not to any creditor individually.67 Thus, a suit for breach of fiduciary duties
owed to creditors is a classically derivative suit. According to the court, "[t]he rea-
son for this bears repeating-the fact of insolvency does not change the primary
object of the director's duties, which is the firm itself'5s Thus, although "the firm's
directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the company's creditors"6 9 and "the
increased risk to creditors is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations towards
the company's creditors,"7" those duties (as well as duties owed to stockholders) are
ultimately subservient to the duties owed to the corporation itself.71
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 791-92 (citing Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931)). Of course, if
such a course of action were pursued today, creditors would have a potential remedy: they could cause such
payments to be avoided by filing an involuntary bankruptcy case and a fraudulent conveyance and/or prefer-
ence lawsuit.
67. Id. at 792 (stating that "even in the case of an insolvent firm, poor decisions by directors that lead to a
loss of corporate assets and are alleged to be a breaches [sic] of equitable fiduciary duties remain harms to the
corporate entity itself").
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 790-91 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
71. One might reasonably ask whether the Vice Chancellor's language, which is uncharacteristically stated
in the passive voice ("are said to owe"; "is said to justify"; "does not completely turn on its head"), implies that
he believes that denominating these as fiduciary duties to creditors is either not technically accurate, confusing,
or not really justified, but has become settled in previous Delaware cases. After all, the court's comment that
creditors are protected by covenants, fraudulent transfer laws and federal bankruptcy law appears equally appli-
cable to insolvent companies as to companies in the zone of insolvency. See id. at 790. Moreover, the Vice
Chancellor states that the rationale for imposing fiduciary duties to creditors on directors of insolvent compa-
nies in part rests on "the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the share-
holders-that of residual risk-bearers," id. at 791, a theory he shied away from earlier in the same opinion. See
id. at 790 n.57 (noting that "[o]f course, when a firm is insolvent, creditors do not become residual claimants
with interests entirely identical to stockholders, they simply become the class of constituents with the key claim
to the firm's remaining assets"). In any event, because the primary duty is to the company itself, and creditors
cannot directly sue for breaches of duties owed to them, the phrasing is likely academic.
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The derivative nature of these types of claims has two primary effects. First,
before bankruptcy, a creditor who wants to commence such a suit must meet all of
the typical requirements of derivative suits. For example, demand must be either
refused or excused, and presumably there could be representative plaintiff issues
and continuous ownership (in this case, indebtedness) requirements." The Court
of Chancery's holding, however, stating that these types of suits are derivative,
should have much less of an influence on the litigation of such suits once a bank-
ruptcy case has been filed.73 In a bankruptcy case, a trustee or a debtor in posses-
sion (or a post-confirmation liquidation trust) unquestionably has direct standing
to bring causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties. Further, the creditors' com-
mittee can also move to obtain standing to pursue derivative claims.74 In either
case, the issue outside of bankruptcy-certain disgruntled creditors attempting to
challenge the ongoing conduct of a board of directors that remains in control of
the company and to receive damages resulting from that conduct-is rarely en-
countered in bankruptcy adversary proceedings.
The second primary effect of the holding that these claims are derivative is that
directors can be exculpated from liability under certain circumstances-the subject
described immediately below.
3. Exculpation of Directors From Personal Liability
Although the Court of Chancery in Production Resources denied a motion to dis-
miss most counts of the complaint, it granted, pursuant to section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, the motion to dismiss the count which sought
damages for breach of the duty of care. Pursuant to section 102(b)(7), a corpora-
tion may include in its certificate of incorporation a provision that exculpates its
directors from personal liability "to the corporation or its stockholders" for mone-
tary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.7' The statute makes no ex-
press mention of whether such an exculpation clause in a certificate of
incorporation also shields directors from personal liability if the suit for personal
liability is filed by a creditor.
Before the Production Resources decision, three non-Delaware federal courts had
addressed the issue, and two held that a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause does
not shield directors from personal liability for suits filed by the corporation's credi-
tors for breach of the duty of care or waste of the corporation's assets.76 Those
72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2004); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
73. Russell C. Silberglied & Kimberly D. Newmarch, Production Resources Decision: A Retreat from the Law
on Fiduciary Duties to Creditors of Insolvent Companies or Merely an Explanation of Standing Requirements?, THE
BANKR. STRATEGIST (Law Journal Newsletter, Philadelphia, Pa.), March 2005, at 6.
74. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 566
(3d Cir. 2003).
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004).
76. See Pereira v. Cogan, No. 00 CIV. 619 (RWS), 2001 WL 243537, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2001); Stein-
berg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), No. 97C7934, 97C6043, 2000 WL 28266, at *7- '8 (N.D.
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courts reasoned that the statute did not specifically mention creditors and therefore
did not cover suits filed by creditors.7 Additionally, they held that a certificate of
incorporation is a contract between a corporation and its stockholders, and not a
contract between the corporation and its creditors. Thus, according to those
courts, because creditors never contractually agreed to such a provision, the section
102(b)(7) exculpation clause is not enforceable against such creditors.
In Production Resources, the Court of Chancery held that a section 102(b)(7)
exculpation clause does protect directors from suits brought by creditors. 9 The
holding was guided by the court's decision that suits by creditors for breach of
fiduciary duties by directors are derivative in nature. Thus, even when a creditor
derivatively prosecutes such a suit, it is the corporation's claim. Therefore, it fits
within the literal wording of section 102(b)(7): "to the corporation or its
stockholders.""
In addition to fitting within the literal wording of the section 102(b)(7), the
Court of Chancery also held that the legislative policy behind section 102(b)(7)
would be frustrated if the Court of Chancery were to follow the Pereira and Stein-
berg decisions. It has long been noted that the policy behind the enactment of
section 102(b)(7) was to encourage talented individuals to serve as directors of
Delaware corporations, free from fear that they would be held personally liable if
their good faith decisions later turned out to have been poor ones."' Thus, if the
Court of Chancery were to hold that directors might have to pay out-of-pocket
damages to creditors who challenged their good-faith, disinterested decision mak-
ing, a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause would be essentially gutted and ineffec-
tive at the time it is most needed. After all, the court reasoned, suits are most likely
to be filed when there is a reason to second guess the directors because the com-
pany's fortunes turned out poorly, and therefore that is when directors need the
protections of section 102(b)(7) the most.
Production Resources has already been followed by the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware (the "District Court"). In Star Telecommunica-
tions, the District Court held that Production Resources is the law of Delaware that
should be followed when deciding issues involving section 102(b)(7) of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law. 2 Additionally, although neither section 102(b)(7)
nor the corporation's charter was mentioned in the complaint filed by the official
Ill. Jan. 12, 2000), but see Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., Inc. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2005).
77. See Pereira, 413 F.3d at 342; Steinberg, 2001 WL 28266, at *8.
78. See Pereira, 413 F.3d at 342; Steinberg, 2001 WL 28266, at *8.
79. 863 A.2d 772, 793-95 (Del. Ch. 2004).
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004) (emphasis added).
81. E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein, & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-
Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399, 403-04 (1987).
82. Continuing Creditors' Comm. of Star Telecomm. Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 462-63 (D.
Del. 2004).
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committee of unsecured creditors, the District Court invoked section 102(b)(7) as a
defense on a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 3 This holding is for the most part consistent with the Delaware Supreme
Court's holding that a case can be dismissed at the pleadings stage by invoking a
section 102(b)(7) clause, albeit introducing this outside document converts the
motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment; despite the conversion, a plaintiff
cannot take discovery on the 102(b)(7) clause unless it has a good faith basis to
challenge its authenticity or the propriety of its adoption.84
Thus, Star Telecommunications makes it clear that if a Delaware corporation's
certificate of incorporation contains a section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause, the
holding of Production Resources is applicable in suits brought in bankruptcy court.
Accordingly, directors are shielded from personal liability for monetary damages
for breach of their duty of care regardless of whether such suits are initiated by the
corporation, stockholders, creditors or an official committee of unsecured credi-
tors. On June 30, 2005, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, reversing Per-
eira and citing Production Resources with approval.85 In so holding, the Second
Circuit confirmed that (a) suits brought by bankruptcy trustees also are governed
by section 102(b)(7), and (b) that courts outside of Delaware will look to Produc-
tion Resources as the authority to apply when confronted with these issues.
II. PEOPLES V. WISE: THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA ADDRESSES
DIRECTOR DUTIES TO CREDITORS
The principal question raised before the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples De-
partment Stores was whether directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation's creditors comparable to the statutory duty owed to the corporation. 6
Although the court put the question before it in such simple terms and decided
that no such fiduciary duty exists, it took the opportunity, as did the Delaware
Court, to explore in dicta the duties and responsibilities of directors of both solvent
and insolvent corporations.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was released in late October 2004.
Although the Court did not have the benefit of the decision in Production Re-
sources, it considered the U.S. approach to the "best interests of the corporation,"
"the trust doctrine," and the "business judgment rule."" It cited with favor an arti-
cle coauthored by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr., "Function over Form: A Reassess-
ment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law," who was about to
83. Id.
84. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1091-92 (Del. 2001).
85. Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d. 330 (2d Cir. 2005).
86. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 466.
87. Id. at 492.
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release his opinion in Production Resources." Like the Delaware Court, the Supreme
Court of Canada stated that the primary duty of the directors is to act in the best
interests of the corporation."
A. Factual Background
Wise Stores Inc. ("Wise") was founded by Alex Wise in 1930 as a small clothing
store in Montreal, Quebec. By 1992, through internal growth and acquisitions, it
had become a publicly traded company operating fifty locations with annual sales
of approximately $100 million. The stores were mostly located in urban areas of
Quebec. The founder's three sons, Lionel, Ralph, and Harold Wise (the "Wise
brothers"), were simultaneously majority shareholders, officers, and directors of the
corporation. Together, they controlled seventy-five percent of the firm's equity.
In 1992, Peoples Department Stores Inc. ("Peoples") had been in business con-
tinuously in one form or another for seventy-eight years. It operated as an unincor-
porated division of Marks & Spencer Canada Inc. ("M&S") until 1991, when it was
incorporated as a separate company. M&S itself was wholly owned by Marks and
Spencer plc ("M&S plc"), a large British firm. Peoples' eighty-one stores were
predominantly located in rural areas, from Ontario to Newfoundland. Peoples had
annual sales of approximately $160 million, but the company still struggled finan-
cially. Its annual losses approached $10 million.
By late 1991, M&S plc had decided to divest itself of all its Canadian operations.
Wise had been interested in purchasing M&S for several years, and a deal was
reached.
Wise incorporated a new company, 2798832 Canada Inc., for the purpose of
acquiring all of the issued and outstanding Peoples shares from M&S. The parties
entered into a share purchase agreement, with a purchase price of $27 million.
The $5 million down payment due to M&S at closing was borrowed from the
Toronto Dominion Bank (the "TD Bank"). According to the terms of the share
purchase agreement, the $22 million balance of the purchase price would be repaid
by M&S over eight years. Wise guaranteed all of the obligations of 2798832 Canada
Inc. pursuant to the terms of the share purchase agreement.
To protect its interests, M&S took a security interest over the assets of Peoples
(subject to a priority in favor of the TD Bank) and negotiated strict covenants
concerning the financial management and operation of the company. In particular,
Peoples could not be amalgamated with Wise until the purchase price had been
paid. This prohibition, in addition to others, was presumably intended to induce
88. W'iliam T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards
of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859 (2001). Vice Chancellor Strine's coauthors in
this article are former Chancellor Allen, who authored the Credit Lyonnais decision, and Justice Jacobs of the
Delaware Supreme Court.
89. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 480.
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Wise to refinance and pay the remainder of the purchase price as early as possible
in order to overcome the strict conditions imposed upon it under the share
purchase agreement.
On January 31, 1993, 2798832 Canada Inc. was amalgamated with Peoples. The
new entity retained Peoples' corporate name. Because 2798832 Canada Inc. had
been a wholly owned subsidiary of Wise, upon amalgamation, the new Peoples
became a subsidiary directly owned and controlled by Wise. The Wise brothers
were Peoples' only directors.
After the acquisition, Wise attempted to rationalize its operations by consolidat-
ing the overlapping corporate functions of Wise and Peoples. The joint operation
of Wise and Peoples did not function smoothly. Parallel bookkeeping combined
with shared warehousing arrangements caused serious problems for both Wise and
Peoples. Both the Wise and Peoples stores experienced numerous shipping disrup-
tions and delays, and inventory records were incorrect and unreliable.
To address the problems, the Wise brothers agreed that they would implement a
joint inventory procurement policy (the "new policy") whereby the two companies
would divide purchasing responsibility. Peoples would make all purchases from
North American suppliers, and Wise would make all purchases from overseas sup-
pliers. Peoples would then transfer to Wise what it had purchased for Wise from
North American suppliers, charging Wise accordingly. Similarly, Wise would trans-
fer to Peoples what it had purchased for Peoples from overseas suppliers, charging
Peoples accordingly. About eighty-two percent of the total inventory of Wise and
Peoples was purchased from North American suppliers, which inevitably meant
that Peoples would be extending a significant trade credit to Wise.
The new policy, which was implemented February 1, 1994, was the cause of the
claims against the Wise brothers after the businesses collapsed. By June 1994, finan-
cial statements prepared to reflect the financial position of Peoples as of April 30,
1994, revealed that Wise owed more than $18 million to Peoples. M&S was con-
cerned about the situation and insisted that the new policy be rescinded. An agree-
ment was executed on September 27, 1994, effective July 21, 1994, which provided
that the new policy would be abandoned as of January 31, 1995. The agreement
also specified that the inventory and records of the two companies would be kept
separate, and that the amount Wise owed to Peoples would not exceed $3 million.
In September 1994, in light of the fragile financial condition of the companies
and the competitiveness of the retail market, the TD Bank announced its intention
to cease doing business with Wise and Peoples as of the end of December 1994.
After negotiations, however, the bank extended its financial support until the end
of July 1995.
In December 1994, the Wise brothers presented financial statements showing
disappointing results for Peoples in its third fiscal quarter. Three days later, M&S
initiated bankruptcy proceedings against both Wise and Peoples. A notice of inten-
tion to make a proposal was filed on behalf of Peoples the same day. Nonetheless,
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Peoples later consented to the petition by M&S, and both Wise and Peoples were
declared bankrupt on January 13, 1995, effective December 9, 1994.
The assets of Wise and Peoples were sufficient to cover in full the outstanding
debt owed to the TD Bank, satisfy the entire balance of the purchase price owed to
M&S, and discharge almost all the landlords' lease claims. The bulk of the unsatis-
fied claims were those of unsecured trade creditors.
After the bankruptcy, Peoples' trustee in bankruptcy filed a petition against the
Wise brothers. The trustee claimed that the Wise brothers had favored the interests
of Wise over Peoples to the detriment of Peoples' creditors, in breach of their duties
as directors under section 122(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act
("CBCA"). o
The Quebec Superior Court found the Wise brothers liable under the CBCA and
held that directors' duties under section 122 of the CBCA, which require them to
take reasonable care and to act in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation, are owed to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency.9' The Quebec Supe-
rior Court found that the Wise brothers breached that duty.92 On appeal, the Que-
bec Court of Appeal was not persuaded by considerable precedent from other
jurisdictions suggesting that such duty shifted to creditors of insolvent or "near
insolvent" businesses.93 The trustee obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. 4
These decisions set off an intense academic debate as to the scope of director
duties in Canada and the extent to which they do or do not, or should or should
not, shift to different stakeholders when a company is insolvent or in the vicinity of
insolvency. The matter has now been settled by the Supreme Court of Canada, with
obiter remarkably similar to that of the Delaware Court.
B. Legal Framework In Canada
The case came before the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of whether direc-
tors owe a duty to creditors under the CBCA. As described above, the duties of
directors of Delaware corporations are established by common law. Duties of direc-
tors of corporations incorporated federally under the CBCA or under the business
corporations statutes of the common-law provinces and territories of Canada are
set out in the respective business corporations statutes. "That directors must satisfy
90. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 § 122(1) (1985) [hereinafter CBCA].
91. [19981 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200, 119981 Q.J. No. 3571, [1998] CarswellQue 3442 (Que. S.C.), rev'd [2003]
41 C.B.R. (4th) 225 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2003], 321 N.R. 193 (note) (S.C.C.), affid [2004] 3
S.C.R. 461 (S.C.C.).
92. Id.
93. [20031 224 D.L.R. (4th) 509, 531-32 (Que. C.A.).
94. For a comprehensive analysis of the decisions of the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec Court of
Appeal, see Janis. P. Sarra, "Wise People, Fiduciary Obligation and Reviewable Transactions: Directors' Liability
to Creditors," in Annual Review ofInsolvency Law (Janis P. Sarra ed., Thomson Carswell 2003). See also Edward
M. lacobucci, Directors' Duties in Insolvency: Clarifying what is at Stake, 39 CAN. Bus. L.J. 398 (2003).
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a duty of care is a long-standing principle of the common law [in Canada], al-
though the duty of care has been reinforced by statute to become more demand-
ing.""5 The appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada focused on the statutory
rather than the common-law duties of directors."
Subsection 122(1) of the CBCA establishes two distinct duties to be discharged
by directors and officers in managing, or supervising the management of, the
corporation:
122. (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers
and discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in comparable circumstances.
97
The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed these duties and their availability to
creditors in the context of Canadian corporate law.9 As the common law requires
in Delaware, 99 directors in Canada by both statute and common law must act hon-
estly and in good faith, with due care, diligence, and skill."°
They must respect the trust and confidence that have been reposed in them to
manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the objects
of the corporation. They must avoid conflicts of interest with the corporation.
They must avoid abusing their position to gain personal benefit.... Directors
and officers must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly, and loyally.'
If they fail to do so, they may be held accountable by the corporation itself or by its
trustee in bankruptcy, or through a derivative action by shareholders or creditors.
Any deference to business judgment is to be accorded only when directors have
made a decision and exercised their judgment in an informed and independent
fashion, after a reasonable analysis of the situation and acting on a rational basis
with reasonable grounds. °2
95. Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise (In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc.), [20041 3 S.C.R. 461,
489.
96. Id. at 481.
97. CBCA § 122(1). For similar provisions in provincial legislation, see, for example, Alberta Business
Corporations Act, R.S.A. 2000, ch. B-9 § 122; Manitoba Corporations Act, R.S.M. 1987, ch. C 225 § 114(2),
(3); Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. B 16 § 134.
98. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 476-93.
99. See discussion supra Part I.B.
100. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 477-80.
101. Id. at 477.
102. UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc., [20021 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496, 530 (Ont.
S.C.J.), affd [2004] (sub nom. UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. Repap Enterprises Inc.) 183 O.A.C. 310 (Ont. C.A.).
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One of the distinctive features of Canadian corporate law is the availability of the
oppression remedy," 3 in addition to derivative claims for breach of director duties,
which are also available in the United States. The oppression remedy changes con-
siderably the landscape for director duties in Canada, as compared to the United
States.
Section 241(2) of the CBCA (and similar provisions of business corporation stat-
utes in the common-law provinces)" 4 allows a complainant to apply to the court
for an order ifi
the court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have
been carried on or conducted in a manner, or
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or
have been exercised in a manner
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the inter-
ests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an
order to rectify the matters complained of.'
A complainant is defined as a security holder or former security holder, a direc-
tor and officer or a former director and officer, the Director appointed by the
government to administer the statute, or "any other person who, in the discretion
of a court, is a proper person to make an application.""1 6
The Court has extremely broad powers under section 241(3) of the CBCA to
make such orders it thinks fit if it concludes that oppressive conduct has occurred.
For instance, the court may make interim or final orders: (i) restraining the con-
duct complained of; (ii) appointing a receiver or receiver-manager; (iii) liquidating
and dissolving the corporation; and (iv) compensating an aggrieved person. 07
Much of the litigation under the oppression remedy concerns disputes between
majority and minority shareholders in closely held corporations. It has also been
used, however, to grant relief to creditors as well as shareholders, including orders
compensating aggrieved creditors for the oppressive conduct of directors. "The fact
that creditors' interests increase in relevancy as a corporation's finances deteriorate
103. See CBCA § 241(2).
104. For similar provisions in provincial legislation, see for example, Alberta Business Corporations Act
§ 242, British Columbia Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, ch. 57, § 227, and Ontario Business Corpora-
tions Act § 248.
105. CBCA § 241(2).
106. Id. § 238; see also Alberta Business Corporations Act § 239 (stating that the definition of complainant
includes "a creditor," provided that leave is granted by the court); Ontario Business Corporations Act § 245.
107. CBCA §241(3).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
PAMELA L.J. HUFF AND RUSSELL C. SILBERGLIED
is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of discretion by a court in granting
standing to a party as a 'complainant' [invoking the oppression remedy.]"' °8
The Supreme Court of Canada noted in Peoples Department Stores the particular
Canadian corporate law landscape:
The Canadian legal landscape with respect to stakeholders is unique. Creditors
are only one set of stakeholders, but their interests are protected in a number of
ways. Some are specific, as in the case of amalgamation: s. 185 of the CBCA.
Others cover a broad range of situations. The oppression remedy of s. 241(2)(c)
of the CBCA and the similar provisions of provincial legislation regarding cor-
porations grant the broadest rights to creditors of any common law jurisdiction:
see D. Thomson, "Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A Fiduciary Duty or a
Duty Not to Oppress?" (2000), 58 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 31, at p. 48. One commen-
tator describes the oppression remedy as "the broadest, most comprehensive and
most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common law world": S.M. Beck,
"Mnority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980s'" in Corporate Law in the 80s
(1982), 311, at p. 312. While Beck was concerned with shareholder remedies,
his observation applies equally to those of creditors.
The fact that creditors' interests increase in relevancy as a corporation's fi-
nances deteriorate is apt to be relevant to, inter alia, the exercise of discretion
by a court in granting standing to a party as a "complainant" under s. 238(d)
of the CBCA as a "proper person" to bring a derivative action in the name of
the corporation under ss. 239 and 240 of the CBCA, or to bring an oppression
remedy claim under s. 241 of the CBCA.' °9
The two instruments, statutory director duties and the oppression remedy, are
aimed at different kinds of conduct, although the facts in a particular case may give
rise to breaches of both."10 Within this corporate landscape, the court considered
the statutory duties of directors under section 241 of the CBCA.
C. The Decision in Peoples Department Stores
The court considered sections 122(1)(a) and 122(1)(b) of the CBCA as creating
two distinct duties, designed to secure different ends, which had to be addressed
separately."' The first duty was referred to in the Peoples Department Stores case as
the "fiduciary duty," the duty under section 122(a) to act honestly and in good
108. Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise (In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461,
484-85.
109. Id.
110. For a comprehensive discussion, see E. lacobucci & K. Davis, Reconciling Derivative Claims and the
Oppression Remedy, (2000) 12 S.C.L.R. (2d) 87.
111. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 476.
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faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation." 2 The court held that it is
better described as the "duty of loyalty," incorporating American terminology."
3
Throughout its decision, however, the court used the expression "statutory fiduci-
ary duty" for purposes of clarity when referring to this duty under the CBCA."4
The second duty was referred to in the Peoples case as the "duty of care," the duty
under section 122(1)(b) to "exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably
prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances."" 5 "Generally speak-
ing, [this duty of care] imposes a legal obligation upon directors and officers to be
diligent in supervising and managing the corporation's affairs."" 6
The following is a summary of the consideration by the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada of these two duties.
1. The Statutory Fiduciary Duty: Section 122(1)(a) of the CBCA
"The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in
good faith [in respect ofi the corporation."' The Supreme Court of Canada de-
scribed such duty of the directors as one to maximize the value of the corporation:
Insofar as the statutory fiduciary duty is concerned, it is clear that the phrase
the "best interests of the corporation" should be read not simply as the "best
interests of the shareholders". From an economic perspective, the "best interests
of the corporation" means the maximization of the value of the
corporation ... ."
The court stated that
in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the
corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for
the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, em-
ployees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment."9
At all times, however, "directors and officers owe their fiduciary obligation to the
corporation. The interests of the corporation are not to be confused with the inter-






117. Id. at 477.
118. Id. at 481.
119. Id. at 482.
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within the consideration of the directors in seeking to maximize the value of the
corporation.'20
Unlike the Delaware court, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the statu-
tory fiduciary duty does not extend to creditors. 2' Like the Delaware court, and
using similar language, however, it dismissed the concept of any shifting duties
when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency.' It recognized that there will
be various shifts in interest that naturally occur as a corporation's fortunes rise and
fall, without altering the fiduciary duty of the directors:
The directors' fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the
nebulous "vicinity of insolvency". That phrase has not been defined; moreover,
it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning. What it is obviously
intended to convey is a deterioration in the corporation's financial stability. In
assessing the actions of directors it is evident that any honest and good faith
attempt to redress the corporation's financial problems will, if successful, both
retain value for shareholders and improve the position of creditors. If unsuc-
cessful, it will not qualify as a breach of the statutory fiduciary duty.'23
In Production Resources, Vice Chancellor Strine described the zone of insolvency
as "an admittedly confusing one" to define and "not ... a simple exercise."' 24 The
Supreme Court of Canada took this concept to its logical conclusion and declared
the zone of insolvency to be "incapable of definition" and as having "no legal
meaning."12'
Vice Chancellor Strine held that the fiduciary duty of directors should not be
used to fill gaps that do not exist.'26 The Supreme Court of Canada found no gap to
fill as well:
In light of the availability both of the oppression remedy and of an action based
on the duty of care, which will be discussed below, stakeholders have viable
remedies at their disposal. There is no need to read the interests of creditors
into the duty set out in s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA. Moreover, in the circum-
stances of this case, the Wise brothers did not breach the statutory fiduciary
duty owed to the corporation.'27
120. Id. at 482-83.
121. Id. at 481-83, 486.
122. Id. at 483.
123. Id.
124. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 789 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2004).
125. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 483.
126. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 789-91.
127. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [20041 3 S.C.R. at 486.
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The court found that the Wise brothers did not breach their statutory fiduciary
duty. "' In seeking to maximize the value of the corporation, the court described
the statutory fiduciary duty of directors as the pursuit of "a better corporation." '29
The court noted that, in 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd., 3° Mr. Justice
Farley held that in resolving a conflict between majority and minority shareholders,
it is safe for directors to act to make the corporation "a better corporation."'' The
Supreme Court of Canada adopted that same expression and found that the Wise
brothers did not breach their statutory fiduciary duty in seeking to make both Wise
and Peoples "better corporation[s]." 32
2. The Statutory Duty of Care: Section 122(1)(b) of the CBCA
Unlike the fiduciary duty in section 122(l)(a) of the CBCA, which specifies that
directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation,
the court commented that "the duty of care in s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not
specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty."'33 Impor-
tantly, the court stated that "the identity of the beneficiary of the duty of care is
much more open-ended, and it appears obvious that it must include creditors."3 4
The statutory duty of care under section 122(l)(b) is characterized "as an objec-
tive standard," what a reasonably prudent person would do in comparable circum-
stances, and the factual aspects of the circumstances surrounding the actions of the
director or officer are important.3
As in Delaware, deference is given to the directors under the business judgment
rule. The court held as follows:
The contextual approach dictated by s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only em-
phasizes the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic condi-
tions to be taken into consideration. . . . Canadian courts, like their
counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect to the enforcement of
the duty of care that respects the fact that directors and officers often have
business expertise that courts do not. Many decisions made in the course of
business, although ultimately unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the
time they are made. Business decisions must sometimes be made, with high
stakes and under considerable time pressure, in circumstances in which de-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 484.
130. 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123, affd (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 113.
131. In re Peoples Dep't Stores Inc., [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 486.
132. Id. at 481.
133. Id. at 488.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 491.
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tailed information is not available. It might be tempting for some to see unsuc-
cessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of information
that becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias,
Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business decisions called
the "business judgment rule", adopting the American name for the rule.'36
Directors and officers will not be held in breach of the duty of care under section
122(l)(b) of the CBCA if they act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis:
The decisions they make must be reasonable business decisions in light of all
the circumstances about which the directors or officers knew or ought to have
known. In determining whether directors have acted in a manner that
breached the duty of care, it is worth repeating that perfection is not de-
manded. Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the ap-
plication of business expertise to the considerations that are involved in
corporate decision making, but they are capable, on the facts of any case, of
determining whether an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence was
brought to bear in reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business deci-
sion at the time it was made.'
The court was clear: "[P]erfection is not demanded." 3 ' Rather, the decisions
made by the directors must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the
circumstances about which the directors knew or ought to have known.'39
The Court found that the Wise brothers, in exercising their business judgment,
met the requisite standard of "a reasonable business decision" based on the business
judgment rule and did not breach the duty of care. 4
D. Opening or Closing the Gap on Creditor Claims Against Directors?
The Supreme Court of Canada clarified the fiduciary duties of directors of Cana-
dian corporations, as did the Delaware Court of Chancery in its jurisdiction. Direc-
tors of corporations do not owe a separate fiduciary duty to creditors of a
corporation in an insolvency situation. In Delaware, there is a fiduciary duty to
creditors, but duties do not shift to creditors in an insolvency scenario. Instead,
they expand to include shareholders and creditors. The nature of the duties does
not change. In Canada, there is no such statutory fiduciary duty owed to the credi-
tors, whether the corporation is solvent or not. The duty remains to the corpora-
tion and does not shift in an insolvency.
136. Id. at 491-92.
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In considering the section 122(b) "duty of care," the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that such duty extends to creditors. 4 ' To what extent does such statement in
obiter dicta open the floodgates for claims by creditors against directors? The Court
acknowledged that the civil law serves as a supplementary source of law to federal
legislation such as the CBCA.Y12 Otherwise, the Court states that "the CBCA does
not entitle creditors to sue directors directly for breach of their duties."'43 The
Court relied on specific provisions of the Quebec Civil Code that gave creditors a
right to bring an action for alleged breaches of statutory duties of care in Quebec.'4
Article 1457 of the Quebec Civil Code requires a person to abide by rules of con-




There are no similar statutory provisions in the common-law provinces and ter-
ritories of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada did not indicate in its reasons to
what extent the section 122(b) duty of care, although it extends to creditors, could
be actionable by creditors in common-law jurisdictions. Directors may be sued for
breach of such duty by the corporation (or the trustee in bankruptcy of the corpo-
ration for the benefit of the creditors). The cause of action of the corporation
against the directors could be taken up derivatively by the creditors or other stake-
holders of the corporation, if the proper steps are taken. Section 239 of the CBCA
permits a complainant to apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name
and on behalf of a corporation for the purpose of prosecuting the action on behalf
of the corporate body."* The complainant may be a creditor, if considered by the
court to be a proper person to make the application.
Which leaves open this question: Has Peoples Department Stores opened the
floodgates for claims against directors or not? One suspects that the Supreme Court
of Canada did not think it was opening the floodgates by denying a fiduciary duty
to creditors and, although acknowledging a duty of care, relying on the Quebec
Civil Code in order to make it actionable by a creditor. It made no accompanying
common-law analysis. To the contrary, it stated that in light of both the availability
of the oppression remedy and of an action based on duty of care (derivatively if not
directly, other than in Quebec), there was no need from a policy point of view to
give creditors more than they already have by expanding the more onerous statu-
tory fiduciary duties of directors to creditors. The answer will be in the future
application of the Peoples Department Stores case.
141. Id. at 488.
142. Id. at 487.
143. Id. at 475.
144. Id. at 487.
145. Id.
146. CBCA § 239.
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III. ADVICE FOR DIRECTORS OF AN INSOLVENT COMPANY
Advice to directors of an insolvent business on either side of the border is the same.
Directors have taken on the task of attempting to maximize the value of the firm.
In doing so, they must act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis and in the
best interests of the corporation, without conflict and without regard to any
outside or personal interest of such director. Courts will not interfere with the
proper exercise of business judgment.
Some may say this puts the bar quite low for director conduct. As long as a
director is acting honestly and reasonably, and without conflict, his or her judg-
ment need not be perfect. Deference to business judgment provides protection for
errors in judgment, but does not shield directors from liability for lack of due
diligence in the decision-making process.
Upon insolvency, or perhaps near insolvency, it is clear from an economic stand-
point that in calling forth sufficient information to enable themselves to act in the
best interests of the corporate enterprise itself on a reasonably informed basis, di-
rectors should strive to understand what is in the best interests of creditors, who in
essence are the residual risk bearers of the corporation at that juncture. This is not
to say that directors must pay heed only to what creditors desire; it is clear in
Canada that no fiduciary duty is owed to the creditors, and in Delaware a fiduciary
duty is owed to both stockholders and creditors. Understanding the realities of a
company's economic situation and its options, however, is likely the key to business
decision making during insolvency. Thus a director's duty of care to the corporate
enterprise itself might well be judged by his or her understanding of the economic
realities and the thought he or she gives to the range of options available to the
corporation and their effect on all constituencies, including creditors.
When viewed in this light, the recognition in Production Resources of fiduciary
duties to creditors of insolvent corporations and the rejection of such a concept in
Peoples Department Stores should not affect the standard for corporate decision
making in Delaware and Canada. Rather, the largest effect of Production Resources
should be in after-the-fact litigation and determining who has standing to bring
litigation. Standing is found in Canada through derivative claims and the oppres-
sion remedy and in Quebec, directly through the Civil Code. The great majority of
such litigation is pursued after a bankruptcy case has been filed, by a trustee in
bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors. At such point, standing is typically no
longer an issue.'47 As a result, the existence or nonexistence of a fiduciary duty to
creditors is likely a distinction with no practical difference.
147. See Silbergied & Newmarch, supra note 73.
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